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Abstract
Cryptocurrencies represent one of the most attractive mar-
kets for financial speculation. As a consequence, they have at-
tracted unprecedented attention on social media. Besides gen-
uine discussions and legitimate investment initiatives, several
deceptive activities have flourished. In this work, we chart the
online cryptocurrency landscape across multiple platforms.
To reach our goal, we collected a large dataset, composed of
more than 50M messages published by almost 7M users on
Twitter, Telegram and Discord, over three months. We per-
formed bot detection on Twitter accounts sharing invite links
to Telegram and Discord channels, and we discovered that
more than 56% of them were bots or suspended accounts.
Then, we applied topic modeling techniques to Telegram and
Discord messages, unveiling two different deception schemes
– “pump-and-dump” and “Ponzi” – and identifying the chan-
nels involved in these frauds. Whereas on Discord we found
a negligible level of deception, on Telegram we retrieved 296
channels involved in pump-and-dump and 432 involved in
Ponzi schemes, accounting for a striking 20% of the total.
Moreover, we observed that 93% of the invite links shared
by Twitter bots point to Telegram pump-and-dump channels,
shedding light on a little-known social bot activity. Charting
the landscape of online cryptocurrency manipulation can in-
form actionable policies to fight such abuse.
Introduction
The explosive growth of online social media has changed
the way we interact, cooperate, make money and get infor-
mation about diverse topics. Social media have also grown in
popularity as a fascinating online showcase in which to pro-
mote and help the cryptocurrency world to grow (Thelwall
2018). As cryptocurrency is thriving worldwide, financial
institutions and countries are debating about its eligibility as
a payment system. However, there are no explicit laws and
regulations on cryptocurrency markets by any government
or institution yet, as the main peculiarities of cryptocurren-
cies are decentralization, highly speculative nature and self-
regulation (Krafft, Della Penna, and Pentland 2018). For this
reason, the cryptocurrency domain lends itself as an excel-
lent breeding ground for manipulation to run wild. Such ma-
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nipulations are often enabled with social media. In fact, on-
line ecosystems are a suitable habitat for deception, which
can be achieved with minimal efforts and may result in high
success rate (Tsikerdekis and Zeadally 2014). Therefore,
there is a growing need to understand how susceptible cryp-
tocurrency markets are to online manipulation.
Literature has investigated forms of fraud such as cryp-
tocurrency thefts (Chohan 2018), “Ponzi” (Chen et al. 2018)
and “pump-and-dump” schemes (Xu and Livshits 2019),
mainly by focusing on discussion forums and market data.
Instead, the role of social media in promoting these frauds
has been largely overlooked and is still unclear. Regarding
frauds, Ponzi scheme is a financial scam that relies on ac-
quiring investors by promising high returns in exchange of
a minimum amount of currency. Those funds are used to
generate profits for old investors and organizers. When the
rate of new investors is not large enough to sustain the pro-
cess, the chain breaks, and last comers lose their investment.
Another well-known type of scam is the pump-and-dump
scheme, where participants collectively aim to artificially
inflate a currency price through coordinated, simultaneous
buying (“pump”). Once outside unaware investors notice the
surge in price and start investing in the asset, the participants
sell to them, thus making a profit and causing a price col-
lapse (“dump”). Generally, there are orchestrators behind the
curtains, who profit even at the expense of the witting par-
ticipants themselves, let alone the other unaware investors.
Social media platforms, such as Telegram and Discord, are
the perfect habitat for such scams to proliferate. They of-
fer anonymity and low levels of moderation. Moreover, they
feature channels as a way to broadcast public messages to
large audiences and to invite investors to join. Indeed, most
successful scams depend on attracting a large mass of users.
This study moves in the direction of investigating a multi-
platform social ecosystem in which cryptocurrencies are dis-
cussed, in order to uncover possible deceptive schemes and
to assess their extent. We pose our focus on the diffusion
of invite links – that is, special URLs allowing users to
join channels. In fact, our controlling idea for this study
is based on the intuition that fraudsters can exploit invite
links to scam channels as an effective way for recruiting
participants to the scam. In addition, diffusion patterns of
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invite links already provided valuable information for de-
tecting homophily and common interests in online commu-
nities (Anderson et al. 2015). In detail, we first collect a
rich dataset of 16M tweets posted between March and May
2019, discussing 3K cryptocurrencies. Then, starting from
those tweets, we retrieve invite links to Telegram and Dis-
cord channels. We then crawl channel messages, looking for
new invite links, and we repeat the process in an iterative,
snowball fashion. We end up with an unprecedented multi-
platform dataset, composed of 10M Discord and 23M Tele-
gram messages, in addition to the 16M tweets. We empha-
size the interplay between agents within and among differ-
ent platforms, by enriching our initial dataset via an anal-
ysis of the nature (i.e., deceptive vs legitimate) of Twitter
accounts and via content analyses for Telegram and Dis-
cord channels. This choice takes into account the differ-
ences between these platforms, affecting how deception is
implemented. Firstly, we focus on the genuineness of Twit-
ter accounts involved in the discussion, looking for traces
of deceptive behaviors. We discover a significant presence
of suspended accounts (19.9%) and bots (36.4%), labeled
by a state-of-the-art technique. Secondly, we perform topic
modeling on Telegram and Discord channels, in order to
label each channel according to its dominant topic. Two
types of cryptocurrency manipulations emerge, resulting in
297 channels performing pump-and-dump and 432 chan-
nels performing Ponzi schemes. Only one pump-and-dump
channel is hosted on Discord, while all the other deceptive
channels belong to Telegram. Accordingly, Discord emerges
as a reasonably healthy ecosystem contrarily to Telegram,
where 56.5% of the cryptocurrency-related channels of our
dataset are involved in deception. At last, we cross-check
these different types of manipulation. We find out that de-
ceptive channels are the ones receiving the most part of the
invite links (87.8%), confirming the founding intuition of
our controlling idea. Moreover, pump-and-dump channels
collect 92.9% of the invite links broadcast by Twitter bots.
This is evidence that Twitter social bots promote deceptive
cryptocurrency content, created for the explicit purpose of
spamming invite links to pump-and-dump channels. This
study strongly contributes to mapping the role of automated
accounts in spreading misinformation through social media,
and it is a good starting point to measure the effects of social
media disinformation and misinformation in the real world.
Contributions of this work. We summarize our main con-
tributions in the following:
• We collect and share a large dataset for studying on-
line cryptocurrency manipulations, comprising more than
50M messages and describing the online cryptocurrency
ecosystem across three major platforms – such as Twitter,
Telegram and Discord.
• We uncover the pivotal role of Twitter bots in broadcast-
ing invite links to deceptive Telegram and Discord chan-
nels, exposing a little-known social bot activity.
• Instead of focusing on specific frauds, we let manipula-
tion patterns naturally emerge from data, highlighting the
existence of 2 different manipulations – namely, pump-
and-dump and Ponzi schemes.
• Our results ultimately demonstrate that Discord can be
considered as a reasonably healthy online cryptocurrency
ecosystem. In contrast, more than 56% of all Telegram
channels are involved in manipulations. Moreover, these
deceptive activities are massively broadcast with the help
of Twitter bots.
Reproducibility. We will release an anonymized, privacy-
preserving version of the dataset upon the paper acceptance.
Related works
Cryptocurrency manipulations. There is still limited lit-
erature on the analysis of cryptocurrencies involving so-
cial media. The majority of previous studies focused on
predicting the effects of specific manipulation activities in
cryptocurrency markets. As an example, (Xu and Livshits
2019) provided a detailed description of pump-and-dump
schemes on Telegram, and developed a model to predict
the likelihood of a coin being the target for manipulation.
More akin to our work is (Mirtaheri et al. 2019), where
authors collected pump-and-dump Telegram channels in a
snowball fashion, starting from a seed of known pump-and-
dump Telegram channels. They focused on predicting the
presence and success of pump operations in terms of meet-
ing the anticipated price targets. They did so by leveraging
market and Twitter data, and they observed the presence of
suspicious Twitter users. Other studies observed that pump-
and-dump phenomena are widespread on both Discord and
Telegram (Feder et al. 2018), and they evaluated the ef-
fects of such activities on the liquidity and price of cryp-
tocurrencies (Li, Shin, and Wang 2018). Pump-and-dump is
not the only financial fraud under scrutiny. In (Vasek and
Moore 2019), authors investigated online Ponzi schemes,
advertised on the Bitcointalk discussion forum. They used
survival analysis to identify factors that affect scam persis-
tence. In (Bartoletti, Pes, and Serusi 2018), authors proposed
machine learning algorithms for automatic classification of
Ponzi schemes involving cryptocurrencies. These important
studies have offered key insights into specific cryptocur-
rency manipulation domains. Instead, here our goal is to of-
fer a more general insight into the bounds of cryptocurrency
manipulation activities that take place across multiple social
media platforms. Widening the perspective beyond social
media, other works focused on discussion forums to iden-
tify and characterize communities by applying topic mod-
eling (Linton et al. 2017), or to predict fluctuation in cryp-
tocurrency prices (Kim et al. 2016). In (Krafft, Della Penna,
and Pentland 2018), authors tried to determine the dynam-
ics of cryptocurrency markets, and demonstrated that trading
bots can alter market behavior.
Other online manipulations. The existence of manipula-
tive, deceptive, synthetic content in online discussions has
already been witnessed in a wide variety of societal top-
ics. For instance, it has been demonstrated that bots are
exploited to promote online financial content (Cresci et al.
2019), as well as health content (Allem and Ferrara 2018).
Other studies showed that bots tampered with US (Bessi and
Ferrara 2016; Addawood et al. 2019), Japanese (Scha¨fer, Ev-
ert, and Heinrich 2017), South Korean (Keller et al. 2017),
channels users messages
Discord 1,755 211,409 10,331,720
Telegram 3,813 920,925 23,812,537
Twitter – 5,745,944 16,840,312
total 5,568 6,878,278 50,984,569
Table 1: Counts of distinct channels, users and messages for
each considered platform.
French (Ferrara 2017), Italian (Cresci et al. 2017a), and Ger-
man (Kupferschmidt 2017) political elections.
In other recent work (Ferrara et al. 2016), it is reported
the emergence of new waves of social bots, capable of mim-
icking human behavior in social media better than ever be-
fore. As social bots evolve, online content manipulation goes
undetected even by platform administrators (Cresci et al.
2017b), with consequent profound impact on content popu-
larity and activity in social media (Aiello et al. 2012). Schol-
ars and platform administrators reacted by proposing more
advanced detection techniques based on the analysis of both
individual (Davis et al. 2016) and collective (Cresci et al.
2017b) behaviors. The current research trend with regards
to online manipulation is shifting from a focus on individ-
ual malicious accounts (e.g., bots, trolls) to a broader and
more sophisticated model that embraces the interplay be-
tween both automated and human-driven behaviors (Star-
bird 2019). However, to the best of our knowledge, the latter
model is yet to be exploited and operationalized.
Designing and collecting the dataset
Preliminaries. Previous works about cryptocurrency ma-
nipulation (Xu and Livshits 2019; Vasek and Moore 2019)
focused on a specific scheme (e.g., pump-and-dump or
Ponzi), aiming to outline its anatomy, assess its efficacy or
predict its occurrence. Accordingly, they relied on datasets
specifically designed to include only data pertinent to the
cryptocurrency manipulation scheme under exam. Con-
versely, here we are interested in performing an unprece-
dentedly wide, horizontal exploration of the online cryp-
tocurrency ecosystem, including multiple platforms and
avoiding any bias towards legitimate or deceptive commu-
nities. In this way, we have the chance to (i) observe decep-
tive schemes naturally emerging from the data, (ii) assess
their spread within the online cryptocurrency ecosystem,
(iii) identify legitimate and deceptive agents (e.g., accounts,
channels), and (iv) study the interplay between them. In or-
der to obtain a dataset with the desired features, we designed
and implemented a crawling strategy based on a snowball
approach. We focused on the Twitter microblogging plat-
form, and on two instant messaging platforms known to host
cryptocurrency communities: Telegram and Discord.
Telegram features two types of group chats: (i) groups –
where all members have privilege to share contents by de-
fault, and (ii) channels – where usually only administrators
broadcast contents to their audience. They can be joined by
means of specific invite links (URLs), which can contain
the required password in case the group or channel is pri-
(a) Total invite links (Tele-
gram).
(b) Distinct invite links
(Telegram).
(c) Total invite links (Dis-
cord).
(d) Distinct invite links
(Discord).
Figure 1: Counts of active and inactive invite links to Tele-
gram (1a, 1b) and Discord (1c, 1d) channels, retrieved at
each hop of our snowball crawling strategy. Telegram at-
tracts much more invite links than Discord (79.2%). The
large number of inactive invite links may reflect the practice
of publishing “expiring” invite links.
vate. Discord features servers (also referred to as guilds), in
which admins can create several channels – each one usually
devoted to a specific topic – and handle the writing privi-
leges. Authorized users can generate invite links (URLs) for
the server, which are specific for the user who created them.
Hereafter, we use the generic term “channel” for Telegram
groups and channels as well as for Discord servers, and the
term “invite link” for every type of URL allowing users to
join a channel.
Data collection. Firstly, we leveraged Twitter’s Streaming
API to collect all tweets mentioning at least one of the 3,822
cryptocurrency cashtags1 provided by the CryptoCompare2
public API. This data collection covered a three months-long
time window spanning from March to May 2019, and re-
sulted in the acquisition of more than 16M tweets. Then, we
retrieved all the invite links contained in these tweets point-
ing to Telegram or Discord channels and we used them as
seeds for an iterative snowball crawling strategy. In partic-
ular, this first set of channels, pointed by those invite links,
represents the hop 0 of our crawl. By leveraging Telegram
and Discord APIs, we collected the message histories of
hop 0 channels. Then, we parsed such messages looking
for more invite links; we retrieved the message histories of
1The cashtag of a cryptocurrency is composed of a dollar sign
followed by the ticker symbol of the cryptocurrency (e.g., $BTC
for Bitcoin). Similarly to hashtags, they can be used to efficiently
tag and filter tweets.
2https://www.cryptocompare.com/
the related (hop 1) channels, and we continued iterating this
data collection pipeline. At hop 3, we retained only invite
links pointing to channels already found at hops 0-2, and we
concluded our crawling. In Table 1, we provide some aggre-
gates of the obtained dataset. As shown, our dataset includes
more than 50M messages, published by almost 7M distinct
users across the three platforms. In particular, we highlight
the unprecedentedly large number of Telegram (3,813) and
Discord (1,755) channels, that guarantees a sound coverage
of the cryptocurrency ecosystem on such platforms. Focus-
ing on the two instant messaging platforms, we notice that
68.5% of the retrieved channels, 81.3% of distinct users and
69.7% of messages belong to Telegram. In Figure 1, we de-
pict the count of active and inactive invite links retrieved at
each hop of our snowball crawling strategy. Considering the
combined amount of invite links for both platforms, Tele-
gram accounts for 79.2% of active and 96.2% of inactive
links. We highlight that our data collection strategy is im-
partial with respect to the two instant messaging platforms.
Hence, we can conclude that Telegram is much more used
than Discord within the online cryptocurrency ecosystem.
Finally, figures 1a, 1b show that at hop > 1 inactive Tele-
gram invite links largely exceed active ones, as opposed to
Discord (figures 1c, 1d). The large number of inactive in-
vites may reflect the practice of publishing “expiring” links,
to promote more elitist, limited access channels.
As an additional contribution of our work, we publish an
anonymized, privacy-preserving version of this dataset,3 to
allow the reproducibility of our experiments and foster fur-
ther research on this important topic.
Building the invite link network
The diffusion of invite links plays a major role in the growth
of online platforms and communities. Moreover, there is a
strong interplay between the structural properties underlying
the diffusion of invites and the characteristic features of the
source and target agents involved in those processes (An-
derson et al. 2015). In particular, the exchange of invites
can be an excellent proxy for homophily or common goals.
Moreover, the effectiveness of cryptocurrency manipulation
schemes depend on the number of participants involved.
Hence, we hypothesize deceptive agents to give a major con-
tribution to the diffusion of invite links. For this reason, we
study this process by building the invite link network, which
is shown in Figure 2. It is a directed, weighted network com-
posed of 13,009 nodes and 62,278 edges. Nodes represent
agents sharing or receiving at least one invite link. In detail,
7,441 (57.2%) nodes are Twitter accounts, 3,813 (29.3%)
are Telegram channels and 1,755 (13.5%) are Discord chan-
nels. Edges are directed from a source node – representing
an agent who broadcasts an invite link, to a target node –
representing the channel pointed by the invite link, and their
weights account for the number of existing invite links be-
tween the two. It is worth noticing that Twitter nodes can
only have outgoing edges, since Twitter accounts cannot re-
ceive invite links.
3The dataset URL will be included upon paper acceptance.
Figure 2: ForceAtlas node-link diagram of the invite link
network. Nodes represent Twitter accounts (blue), Telegram
(green) and Discord channels (violet) sharing or receiving
at least one invite link. Edges are colored by their source
node color. Peculiar network structures emerge, such as a
dense cluster of Telegram channels (bottom-left inset) and
star structures (bottom-right inset).
Figure 2 shows a node-link diagram of the network, re-
alized with the ForceAtlas algorithm. Node size is propor-
tional to the number of members of a channel or the number
of followers of a Twitter account – that is, to the size of the
potential audience of the agent. Nodes are colored accord-
ing to the corresponding platform. Edge thickness is propor-
tional to the weight, and their color is the same as that of
the source node. ForceAtlas determines the layout of nodes
so that nodes connected by strong links appear close to each
other in the diagram. Figure 2 shows the presence of a giant
component, including 91% of nodes and having a diameter
of 19. Since the giant component includes most of the nodes
and links, we focus the rest of our analyses on it. The gi-
ant component includes a strongly clustered community of
Discord channels, weakly connected to the rest of the nodes
and represented as an isolated violet “hairball”, located near
the center of Figure 2. Within the rest of the giant compo-
nent, there is still a clear separation between Discord and
Telegram nodes. A very dense cluster of Telegram channels
(green-colored) is magnified in the bottom-left corner of the
plot. Twitter nodes (blue-colored) appear as frequently ar-
ranged in a ring surrounding a single channel – usually a
Telegram one – thus forming a star structure. An example
of this feature is magnified in the bottom-right corner of the
plot. We counted 135 of these structures having a size of
at least 10 accounts, 107 of which (79.2%) are centered on
a Telegram channel. Interestingly, these preliminary results
highlight the presence of peculiar network structures (e.g.,
dense clusters, stars), likely representative of some interest-
ing real-world phenomena.
Notably, Telegram and Discord nodes exchange invite
links almost exclusively with nodes belonging to the same
platform. Focusing on the edge counts, Discord-Discord
edges (40,040) account for 64.3% of the total, followed by
Telegram-Telegram (11,098, 17.8%) and Twitter-Telegram
(8,371, 13.4%) edges. Twitter-Discord edges (1,686) are
2.7% of the total, while Discord-Telegram (527) and
Telegram-Discord (556) edges are less than 1%. Accord-
ing to this results, Discord emerges as a highly intercon-
nected environment, where each channel exchanges invite
links with many others. When also taking into account edge
weights – that is, when accounting for the actual number
of invite links – the results are very different. Telegram-
Telegram (186,903) edges are 60.1% of the total, whereas
Discord-Discord (60,972) ones end up in second place
(19.6%). Discord-Telegram and Telegram-Discord edges are
still very few (less than 1%). Twitter exhibits strong rela-
tionship with Telegram (57,377, 18.5%), but the amount of
invites toward Discord is now very little (less than 1%). As
opposite to Discord, Telegram channels are connected with
fewer other channels, but with much stronger links.
In the next section, we deepen our analysis of the invite
network by enriching the nodes with semantic features, with
the goal of providing explanations for its peculiar structures.
Enriching the invite link network
Tracking cryptocurrency manipulation schemes within the
multiform ecosystem enclosed in our dataset requires to
overlap layers of knowledge over the map sketched until
now. In particular, we want to characterize the nodes of our
network according to their genuineness and content traits, in
order to drive further analyses.
Assessing the nature of Twitter accounts
Besides human users, the Twitter platform is populated by
bots. These are accounts controlled by computer algorithms,
able to automatically produce content and interact with other
accounts, emulating human behaviour. Some bots perform
neutral or even useful tasks, but some others instead attempt
to manipulate and deceive genuine social media users, pur-
suing malevolent purposes (Ferrara et al. 2016). Hence, in
this section we aim at measuring the contribution of Twitter
social bots to the diffusion of invite links, in order to evalu-
ate their role in cryptocurrency manipulation schemes.
We performed bot detection on the 7,441 Twitter ac-
counts broadcasting invite links. We used Botometer (Davis
et al. 2016), a state-of-the-art Twitter bot detection ser-
vice, publicly-available via REST API.4 Botometer is a su-
pervised machine learning classification model, combining
more than a thousand features extracted from profile meta-
data, friends, social network structure, temporal activity pat-
terns, language and sentiment. The service takes an account
ID as input and returns two scores: one is called “universal”,
because it disregards language and sentiment features; the
other is specific for English accounts. Since our dataset in-
cludes several non-English accounts, we used the universal
score, labeling as bots those accounts having a score ≥ 0.5.
Botometer classified 2,710 accounts as bots, resulting in
a remarkable fraction of 36.4% of the total. Other 1,483
(19.9%) were already suspended by Twitter, again testify-
ing some sort of malicious behavior. By grouping together
4https://rapidapi.com/OSoMe/api/botometer
Figure 3: Invite link network highlighting deceptive Twitter
accounts. A large portion of Twitter accounts has a deceptive
nature (56.3%). The typical star structures frequently corre-
spond to botnets promoting a single channel. We found 69
botnets with a size of at least 10 elements.
bots and suspended accounts, we discover that more than a
half (56.3%) of the Twitter accounts involved in invite link
broadcasting have a deceptive nature. This remarkable frac-
tion of deceptive accounts largely exceeds previous estima-
tions of overall Twitter bot population, ranging from 9% to
15% (Varol et al. 2017). Instead, it approaches the fraction
of 71% of bots, recently observed when considering most
active accounts broadcasting stock-related messages (Cresci
et al. 2019). To this regard, our finding reinforces the knowl-
edge that social bots proliferate in those scenarios involving
strong economical incentives. In the remainder, we address
both bots and suspended accounts as “deceptive” or bots,
whereas we define groups of such accounts as “botnets”.
In Figure 3, we highlight Twitter deceptive accounts in
the invite link network by coloring the corresponding nodes.
Clusters of deceptive accounts clearly emerge, frequently as-
suming the star shape mentioned in the previous section. At
that time, we counted 135 of them in the network, having a
size of at least 10 accounts. Now, we find 69 botnets with
the same minimum size, 56 of which (81.1%) are promoting
a single Telegram channel. Hence, those star structures can
be confidently interpreted as Twitter botnets.
Characterizing Discord and Telegram discussions
In the previous section, we characterized Twitter nodes ac-
cording to their genuine or deceptive nature. Now, we fo-
cus on Telegram and Discord channels, and on the content
of the messages shared therein. In detail, we highlight the
main topics of discussion within each platform by applying
topic modeling. Then, we refine the granularity of our analy-
sis by labeling each channel according to its dominant topic.
Notably, a similar approach was already applied to online
forums by (Linton et al. 2017), with interesting results.
To perform topic modeling, we adopted a recent, cutting-
edge algorithm known as Anchored Correlation Explanation
(CorEx) (Gallagher et al. 2017). As opposed to generative
rank words label
Telegram
1
ref, referral, withdraw, bonus, paying,
doubler, instant, legit, doge, automatic
Ponzi scheme
3
pump, target, signal, stoploss, market,
dump, chart, price, resistance, sell
pump-and-dump
4
exchange, token, coin, crypto, blockchain,
wallet, cryptocurrency, tokens, exchanges, listed
legitimate crypto
11
game, games, fun, players, play,
items, item, multiverse, edition, dragons
gaming and entertainment
Discord
1
anime, chill, roblox, nsfw, memes,
hangout, gamers, giveaways, chats, fortnite
gaming and entertainment
2
wallet, coin, exchange, crypto, blockchain,
token, cryptocurrency, btc, coins, address
legitimate crypto
9
pump, signal, target, people, money,
high, big, pretty, better, buy
pump-and-dump
11
referral, bonus, ref, hosting, withdraw,
services, service, network, website, opportunity
Ponzi scheme
Table 2: Topic modeling results, obtained by applying An-
chored Correlation Explanation (CorEx) to Telegram and
Discord channels. Two online cryptocurrency manipulation
schemes emerge: Ponzi and pump-and-dump.
models – such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) – CorEx
learns latent topics over a collection of documents without
assuming any particular data generating model. Instead, it
leverages the dependencies of words in documents through
latent topics, by maximizing the total correlation between
groups of words and the respective topic. This approach
ensures greater flexibility, enabling hierarchical and semi-
supervised variants (Gallagher et al. 2017). In particular, it
features word anchoring, a semi-supervised technique im-
proving topic separability with minimum human interven-
tion. In fact, by providing some sets of anchor words rele-
vant for specific topics, it is possible to push the model to
better identify and separate them.
Unsupervised topic extraction. We first applied CorEx
without anchoring (i.e., in a completely unsupervised fash-
ion), in order to discover topics spontaneously emerging
from our data. To increase the accuracy of our results, we
learned two separate models for Discord and Telegram, in
order to account for possible differences in topics and forms
of speech between the two platforms. In addition, we also
filtered channels based on the prevalent language of their
messages. In particular, we used the Python library poly-
glot (Al-Rfou’, Perozzi, and Skiena 2013) to estimate the
prevalent language of each channel, and we neglected non-
English ones. As a result, we retained 64.6% of all Tele-
gram channels and 89.5% of all Discord channels. In this
way, we obtained much more accurate results in terms of
detected topics, at the cost of discarding just a minority of
all channels involved in cryptocurrency discussions. After
experimenting with different configurations, we set the ex-
pected number of topics to 12, since additional topics were
adding negligible correlation to the learned models. Finally,
we ranked the obtained topics according to the fraction of
(a) Example of Telegram “Ponzi
scheme” chat.
(b) Example of Telegram
“pump-and-dump” chat.
Figure 4: Chats of the cryptocurrency manipulation chan-
nels, showing the typical deception patterns outlined as red
flags for recognizing Ponzi and pump-and-dump schemes.
the total correlation that they explain.
For Discord, the topic related to “gaming and entertain-
ment” (characterized by words like anime, memes, gamers)
explains most of the total correlation of the model. In fourth
position, we find a topic related to cryptocurrencies, char-
acterized by generic words like wallet, coin, exchange, btc.
Regarding Telegram, the most important topic learned by
CorEx is characterized by words such as referral, withdraw
and bonus. By leveraging results of previous studies (Chen
et al. 2018), we are able to connect this topic to the well-
known financial scam called Ponzi scheme, previously de-
scribed in the Introduction. As a further confirmation of
our labeling, the Telegram messages belonging to this topic
share all the features outlined by the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission 2013) as red flags for recognizing Ponzi schemes:
(i) promises of high investment returns with little or no risk,
(ii) overly consistent returns, (iii) unregistered investments,
(iv) unlicensed seller, (v) secretive and/or complex invest-
ment strategies, and (vi) no minimum investor qualifications.
Another interesting finding is that channels associated to this
topic are characterized by many similar messages repeat-
edly posted by Telegram bots, as shown in Figure 4a. The
fourth topic is characterized by words like pump, buy, sell
and resistance, that can be easily related to pump-and-dump
schemes (Xu and Livshits 2019), previously discussed in the
Introduction. Figure 4b provides a typical example of a chat
in which organizers mobilize participants for the upcoming
pump signal. They provide the target coin (e.g., $NAV) at
the scheduled time, and they subsequently comment the re-
sults of the operation. In sixth, seventh and ninth positions,
we find topics related to legitimate cryptocurrency discus-
sions. One topic includes words related to technological as-
pects (blockchain, technology, platform), the other two are
oriented to finance (trading, investment). Similarly to Dis-
cord, also Telegram has a “gaming and entertainment” topic,
Figure 5: Invite link network with nodes colored accord-
ing to their prevalent topic. It shows a dense cluster of
Ponzi scheme channels engaged in mutual promotion. In-
stead, pump-and-dump channels are scattered across the net-
work. The weakly connected Discord community is mainly
engaged in game and entertainment.
occurring in the twelfth position.
Semi-supervised topic extraction. Since we are interested
in studying manipulations within the cryptocurrency ecosys-
tem, we also leveraged the word anchoring feature of CorEx
to improve topic separability, focusing on legitimate cryp-
tocurrency, Ponzi scheme and pump-and-dump topics. We
leveraged previous findings, obtained with the unsupervised
approach, and domain knowledge derived from existing lit-
erature to choose appropriate anchor words. Despite Ponzi
scheme and pump-and-dump don’t emerge spontaneously
on Discord, we leveraged the capability of anchored topic
modeling to find underrepresented topics, by forcing the
same anchor words as Telegram. The results of this analysis
are resumed in Table 2, where topics are ranked according
to the amount of total correlation explained. For each topic,
words are ordered according to mutual information with the
topic, and anchors are highlighted in bold. Discord is still
dominated by the “gaming and entertainment” topic. Thanks
to anchoring, the legitimate cryptocurrency topic jumped to
the second position and improved its quality, as confirmed
by the coherence of non-anchored words. Despite anchoring,
pump-and-dump and Ponzi schemes confirmed low contri-
bution to correlation and poor internal coherence, showing
marginal diffusion among Discord channels. For Telegram,
anchoring increased the contribution of our topics of interest
to the model correlation. Excellent topic quality was con-
firmed by the occurrence of non-anchored words with high
coherence within each topic, like dump and resistance for
pump-and-dump, or doubler and instant for Ponzi schemes.
Channel labeling. We used the two semi-supervised models
to label Discord and Telegram channels according to their
prevalent topic. In particular, we are interested in topics re-
lated to legitimate or deceptive cryptocurrency discussion.
We leveraged CorEx to compute the correlation of chan-
Figure 6: Heatmap of the count of channels per topic by plat-
form. As opposite to Discord, Telegram shows high correla-
tion with cryptocurrency-related topics, together with a re-
markable presence of deceptive channels.
nel textual contents with each possible topic. Then, we la-
beled each channel with the most correlated topic. Notably,
the incidental mentioning of just a few words of a topic in
a channel is not sufficient to assign that topic as the chan-
nel label. Conversely, prevalent topics are determined by the
systematic co-occurrence of the related words. Therefore,
this labeling technique ensures sound results, as confirmed
by manual inspection. Despite its accuracy cannot reach the
one of a supervised classification model, our technique pre-
vents possible biases towards specific cryptocurrency decep-
tion schemes that may be introduced by human annotators.
In particular, Ponzi and pump-and-dump schemes sponta-
neously emerged from the data, whereas other well-known
schemes (e.g., cryptocurrency thefts) did not.
In Figure 5, we color the invite link network nodes ac-
cording to the assigned topic. Uncolored nodes correspond
to Twitter accounts, non-English channels and channels with
a non-labeled (i.e., generic, uninteresting) topic. The iso-
lated community of Discord channels, already mentioned
in the previous section, is clearly dominated by the gam-
ing and entertainment topic (86.2% of nodes). A cluster of
Ponzi scheme Telegram channels clearly emerges, which ap-
proximately corresponds to the cluster of Telegram chan-
nels magnified in Figure 2. Conversely, pump-and-dump and
legitimate cryptocurrency channels are scattered across the
network. In Figure 6, a heatmap shows the channel counts
per topic per platform, focusing on cryptocurrency-related
topics. Consistently with topic modeling results, Discord
has low correlation with cryptocurrencies, with 58 chan-
nels labeled as legitimate cryptocurrency (3.3%), only one
pump-and-dump and zero Ponzi scheme. On the contrary,
Telegram hosts 504 legitimate cryptocurrency (13.2%), 432
Ponzi scheme (11.3%), and 296 pump-and-dump (7.8%)
channels. Hence, the high correlation with cryptocurrency-
related topics is confirmed, together with a remarkable pres-
ence of cryptocurrency manipulation channels.
Uncovering cryptocurrency manipulations
In previous sections, we sketched a map of the online cryp-
tocurrency landscape, by building the invite link network.
Then, we added two semantic layers. The first one allowed
us to label Twitter nodes according to their genuine or de-
ceptive nature, while the second one characterized Telegram
(a) Neighbour network of Ponzi scheme channels. (b) Neighbour network of pump-and-dump channels.
Figure 7: Portions of the invite link network in direct contact with deceptive Ponzi scheme (7a) and pump-and-dump channels
(7b). While Ponzi scheme channels are strongly engaged in mutual promotion, pump-and-dump channels are mainly endorsed
by star structured Twitter botnets.
and Discord channels according to their prevalent topic of
discussion. In this way, two schemes of deception naturally
emerged: pump-and-dump and Ponzi scheme. Now that we
have charted the online landscape of cryptocurrency manip-
ulations, we leverage our map for investigating the tracks
of manipulation. Firstly, we “zoom in” to focus on the por-
tions of the original network in direct contact with the decep-
tive channels. Then, we “zoom out” to interpret our results
within the general framework of online manipulation.
Ponzi schemes. In Figure 7a, we isolate Ponzi scheme
nodes, their first neighbours and the related edges. The 432
Ponzi scheme channels are colored in pale blue, whereas
other channels are colored according to the platform they
belong to. We distinguish Twitter accounts according to
their genuine (blue-colored) or deceptive (red-colored) na-
ture. The scene is dominated by Telegram and Twitter plat-
forms (1,124 and 1,696 nodes, respectively), with only 106
Discord nodes. We count 600 genuine and 1,096 deceptive
Twitter accounts, resulting in a fraction of deceptive ac-
counts of 64.6%, significantly higher than the one measured
for the whole network (56.3%). There are 11 Twitter bot-
nets having a size of at least 10 nodes, promoting a Ponzi
scheme channel. They account for the 15.9% of the total,
while Ponzi scheme channels are only the 7.8% of the to-
tal amount of Discord and Telegram channels. Two exam-
ples of those botnets are magnified in Figure 7a, in panels A
and B. As shown, they feature the typical star structure that
we previously highlighted. In panel C, we also highlight a
dense cluster of Ponzi scheme Telegram channels, roughly
corresponding to the one shown in Figure 5. This cluster
is the largest cryptocurrency manipulation hub found in our
study. It is composed of 166 Telegram nodes, 63 (39.8%)
of which are Ponzi scheme channels. To understand its role
within the Ponzi scheme ecosystem, in Figure 8a we repre-
sent the heatmap of the number of invites per source node
platform and target node topic. For source nodes, we also
separate genuine Twitter accounts from deceptive ones. Re-
sults show that Ponzi scheme channels collect 71.4% of in-
vite links shared by Telegram source nodes in the whole net-
work. Moreover, in 92.3% of cases, invites targeting Ponzi
scheme channels originated from other Ponzi scheme chan-
nels. Hence, most of the diffusion of invites to Ponzi scheme
channels was carried out, within the examined cluster, by
other Ponzi scheme channels. The engagement on mutual
promotion within the Ponzi scheme cluster is further con-
firmed by Figure 8b, showing that the top-10 channels with
highest weighted out degree perform Ponzi schemes.
Pump-and-dump. In Figure 7b, we depict the neigh-
bour network of pump-and-dump channels. Pump-and-
dump channels are colored in yellow, whereas for other
nodes we apply the same convention as before. Besides the
297 pump-and-dump nodes, the network is composed of
1,917 Twitter, 504 Telegram and 52 Discord nodes. Pump-
and-dump nodes are scattered across the network, and it is
not possible to identify any cluster of them. Also in this
case, the fraction of Twitter accounts having a deceptive na-
ture (65.4%) significantly exceeds the one measured on the
whole network. They are frequently organized in botnets. In
detail, we spot 15 botnets with a size of at least 10 accounts,
promoting a pump-and-dump channel. They account for the
21.7% of the observed botnets, resulting overrepresented if
we consider that pump-and-dump are only 5.3% of the to-
tal channels. To estimate the contribution of those botnets
in promoting pump-and-dump channels, we again resort to
the heatmap of Figure 8a. We find out that Twitter decep-
tive accounts contribute to the 75.4% of all the invite links
to pump-and-dump channels. Conversely, 92.9% of invite
links, diffused by Twitter deceptive accounts, point to pump-
and-dump channels. The effectiveness of Twitter deceptive
accounts in promoting pump-and-dump channels is further
proved by Figure 8b, showing that five of the top-6 channels
with highest weighted in degree are labeled as pump-and-
dump. The first three of them are magnified in Figure 7b.
They appear surrounded by their respective botnets, respon-
sible for the high weighted in degree of their target channels.
The botnet in panel B promotes the MET∆.Symetra Tele-
gram channel, resulting in the star structure that was mag-
nified in figures 2 and 3. This channel and its botnet rep-
resent the largest invite diffusion hub in our study. Yet, to
the best of our knowledge, the existence of this pump-and-
(a) Heatmap of the number of
invites per source node plat-
form and target node topic.
(b) Top-10 cryptocurrency-related
channels, sorted by weighted out
(left) and in (right) degrees. Bars
are colored according to the chan-
nel prevalent topic.
Figure 8: Interplay between invite link diffusion and channel
behaviour. Figure 8a shows that deceptive channels attract
the most part of invites (87.8%). Ponzi scheme channels are
mainly promoted within Telegram, while pump-and-dump
channels receive most of the invites from Twitter deceptive
accounts. Figure 8b confirms deceptive channels as the ma-
jor hubs of invite diffusion. In fact, no legitimate cryptocur-
rency channel ranks in the top-10 in/out degree nodes.
dump channel was unknown prior to our analysis, since it
was never mentioned in existing studies, nor it is reported in
authoritative lists of known pump-and-dump channels (Xu
and Livshits 2019). This striking result further supports the
soundness of our method and the impact of our findings.
Zooming out to the general framework. Our exploration
of the online cryptocurrency ecosystem confirms the con-
cerns about the susceptibility of cryptocurrency markets to
online manipulation, raised by authoritative agencies (U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 2018; U.S. Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission 2013). While Discord ap-
pears as an overall healthy environment, Twitter and Tele-
gram reveal a strong interplay between numerous deceptive
agents, engaged in promoting scams. The choice of the in-
vite link diffusion as the compass orienting our route proved
to be particularly suitable for tracking online cryptocurrency
manipulations. It was motivated by two hypotheses: (i) the
exchange of invite links implies homophily and common
goals between the involved agents, and (ii) cryptocurrency
manipulation stimulates invite link diffusion, because the
efficacy of deceptive schemes strongly depends on recruit-
ing a large number of participants. The first claim is sup-
ported by the existence of the dense cluster of Telegram
Ponzi scheme channels, strongly committed in mutual pro-
motion. Further confirmation comes from the finding of sev-
eral Twitter botnets, specially created to promote pump-and-
dump channels. In both cases, agents sharing similar fea-
tures, behaviours and goals result strongly connected by the
invite link diffusion. The second intuition is brilliantly con-
firmed by results shown in Figure 8b, proving that legiti-
mate channels collect a negligible fraction of the overall in-
vite links (12.2%). In contrast, cryptocurrency manipulation
emerges as the main trigger for invite link diffusion in the
online cryptocurrency ecosystem.
Our study allows to estimate the alarming extent of de-
ception in the online cryptocurrency ecosystem. In fact, the
56.5% of the cryptocurrency-related channels in our dataset
is involved in deception, despite the fact that we avoided to
bias our data crawling towards them, as instead done in the
majority of previous works (Xu and Livshits 2019; Mirtaheri
et al. 2019). Moreover, Twitter botnets emerge as the main
vehicle for spreading pump-and-dump invites. This result
enriches our knowledge on Twitter bot activities with a new
element, relating our work with the flourishing line of re-
search that aims to estimate how social bots manage to con-
dition human activities in various ways, from contaminating
the social debate (Stella, Ferrara, and De Domenico 2018)
to adulterating the economic processes (Cresci et al. 2019;
Cresci et al. 2018). Notably, our findings are not merely de-
scriptive, but they provide actionable knowledge to counter-
act cryptocurrency manipulations. In fact, tracking the ma-
jor hubs of invite diffusion is a simple, effective way to spot
malicious agents and manipulation schemes, as proven by
the discovery of the previously unknown deceptive channels.
Moreover, the success of these manipulations depend on the
possibility to exploit invite link and Twitter bots. Hence, lim-
iting the diffusion of invites and reducing the activity of bots
would severely impair the efficacy of these frauds. Enforcing
such actions could be particularly relevant for authorities re-
sponsible for the safety of the online financial markets, like
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Cryptocurrencies were born to empower the dream of
an accountable, decentralized, democratic payment method,
preserving the user privacy and subtracting the consumer
habits to the undesired scrutiny of governments and corpo-
rations. In the same way, the Web was meant to realize the
promise of an ecosystem granting free speech and equal ac-
cess to information, goods and opportunities to every human
being. Unfortunately, the conjunction between the potential-
ities of cryptocurrencies and the Web has opened the Pan-
dora’s box of criminal darknet markets, wild financial spec-
ulation, money laundering, criminal and terrorist organiza-
tion financing and deceptive manipulations (Brown 2016).
This work addresses a peculiar example of those threats.
Despite its specificity, typical patterns of online deception
emerged, confirming the pervasiveness of these nasty phe-
nomena across multiple aspects of online human activities.
This work thus contributes towards raising collective aware-
ness about the risks and the opportunities offered by cryp-
tocurrencies to our Society, and to stimulate further research
for designing countermeasures to the related threats.
Concluding remarks
Motivated by the increasing alarm raised by institutions
about cryptocurrency manipulation, we mapped the online
cryptocurrency ecosystem to identify, assess and character-
ize possible threats. By cross-checking over 50M messages
across Twitter, Telegram and Discord platforms, we anal-
ysed the diffusion of invite links to cryptocurrency-related
channels. Results confirmed our controlling idea, based on
the hypothesis that invite link exchange is a proxy for ho-
mophily and common goals between the involved agents, as
well as a characteristic pattern related to deceptive schemes.
First, we observed that two cryptocurrency manipulation
schemes emerged – “pump-and-dump” and “Ponzi” – both
affecting Telegram much more than Discord. Then, we iden-
tified a dense cluster of Ponzi scheme channels, so engaged
in mutual promotion as to contribute to the 71.4% of the
overall invite link diffusion measured on Telegram. Finally,
we reported on 15 Twitter botnets that are responsible for
the 75.4% of invite links to pump-and-dump channels, thus
adding a new piece of knowledge about social bot activities.
Since institutions are evaluating the eligibility of cryp-
tocurrencies as legal payment method, our research com-
munity must raise awareness and design countermeasures to
possible threats related to this emerging scenario. This work
provides actionable knowledge, suitable to enforce more ef-
fective responses. As part of our follow up work, we plan to
cross-check our social media data with the cryptocurrency
price trends to predict upcoming manipulations.
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